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A review of market structure and firm conduct in European food 
processing industries, as well as the policies of Member State governments 
to the movement of goods across borders, suggests that the pace of market 
integration in the sector of the EC economy will be slower than sometimes 
predicted.




















































































































































































%  E C  12
Employment 2,259,800 1.7
Production 350,451 million ECU 8.0
Exports extra-EC 24,360 million ECU 7.17
Imports extra-EC 19,833 million ECU 7.01
Intra-EC trade 50,083 million ECU N /A
Table 1: Food and drink in the E C  economy, 1989
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1991b, ch. 15; trade data 
refer to food, drink, and tobacco sectors.
1 Introduction
Food processing industries link the agricultural sector of the economy with the 
final consumer. Their place in the EEC is important: in 1989, the food and 
drink sector ranked number two by output and number four by employment 
among EC industrial sectors. As Table 1 indicates, they account as well for 
a substantial portion of trade flows within the Community and between the 
Community and the rest of the world.
For this reason, the food sector is a test case for European economic 
integration. If integration succeeds in the food and drink sector, it can succeed 
everywhere. If it does not succeed in a sector like food and drink, with its high 
levels of intra-EC exchange, there is reason to suspect that integration will 
progress much more slowly than has been hoped. Here I examine the prospects 
for and problems of EC integration in the food and drink sector.
After reviewing the structure o f European food processing industries and 
the firms that operate in those industries, I turn to an examination of the 
European Commission’s predictions of the potential gains from the formation of 
a single European market in the food and drink sector. This discussion provides 
a background for an assessment of EC policy toward national measures that 
have tended to impede the free movement of food and drink products within 




























































































Industry France G erm any Italy U .K .
Bread 0.12 0.40 0.04 0.29
Canned vegetables 0.55 N /A 0.50 0.58
Flour 0.55 N /A N /A 0.96
Processed meat 0.7 0.30 0.40 N /A
Salt — — — 0.45
Sugar — — — 0.24
Sugar confectionery 1.4 4.2 6.0 2.1
Baby foods 1.3 1.2 4.2 2.2
Beer 5.0 1.0 N /A 1.0
Biscuits 2.9 5.1 8.0 1.9
Mineral water 5.0 1.5 4.1 2.7
Pet foods 4.2 8.4 N /A 4.3
Soup 5.7 5.6 N /A 6.0
Soft drinks 2.2 3.8 5.4 1.2
Table 2: A dvertising—Sales R atios, E uropean  F ood  P rocessing Indus­
tries
Source: Sutton (1991, p. 107).
2 Markets and Firms
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 A dvertisin g
At the risk of oversimplification, food product markets may be divided into two 
broad categories —  those for relatively homogeneous products and those for 
which product differentiation is significant. The distinction between the two 
groups appears clearly, if approximately, in terms of spending on advertising. 
For commodity-type products, advertising-sales ratios are relatively low (Ta­
ble 2): near zero for industries like bread, canned vegetables, flour, processed 
meat, salt, and sugar. Spending on advertising is typically much higher for 
product lines where branding and brand images are important, like biscuits, 





























































































Industry France Germany Italy U.K.
Bread 4.5 7.0 4.0 58.0
Canned vegetables 40.0 N /A 80.0 81.0
Flour 29.0 38.0 6.7 78.0
Processed meat 23.0 22.0 11.0 N /A
Salt 98.0 93.0 80.0 99.5
Sugar 81.0 60.0 72.0 94.0
Baby foods 88.0 83.0 88.0 80.0
Beer 82.0 25.0 55.0 59.0
Biscuits 62.0 49.0 46.0 62.0
Mineral water 77.0 27.0 55.0 73.0
Pet foods 86.0 93.0 N /A 83.0
Soft drinks 70.0 57.0 84.0 48.0
Soup 91.0 84.0 N /A 75.0
Sugar confectionary 51.0 39.0 29.0 38.0
Table 3: Four—firm seller concentration ratios, European Food Pro­
cessing Industries
Source: Sutton (1991, p. 106).
2.1.2 Seller Concentration
The conventional economic index of the size distribution of firms is the so-called 
concentration ratio, the combined market shares of leading firms in the industry. 
Small values of the concentration ratio mean that an industry comes close to a 
competitive market structure; large values raise the possibility of oligopolistic 
behavior. Table 3 shows that there are substantial variations in seller concen­
tration across sectors and across countries in the European Community. Some 
food industries have similar concentration levels in different national markets: 
salt, sugar, soup, pet foods and baby foods are highly concentrated in all four 
national markets described in Table 3; sugar confectionery is moderately con­
centrated throughout; and processed meat has a low concentration level in the 
three national markets for which data is available. In other cases, however, one 
or more national markets appears as an outlier. The bread and flour markets 
in the UK, for example, are much more concentrated than other EC member 
states. The German beer and mineral water industries are much less concen­




































































































Nestle Switzerland 6 38,483.3 218,005
BSN Group France 53 12,497.4 58,063
Cadbury Schweppes UK 103 5,144.0 36,579
Eridania Beghin-Say France 172 8,775.2 25,036
Associated British Foods UK 173 6,031.1 51,724
United Biscuits UK 204 4,756.3 38,698
Northern Foods UK 258 3,090.5 20,219
Tate & Lyle UK 269 5,024.4 17,004
Suedzucker Germany 288 3,240.4 10,985
Bois Wessanen Netherlands 298 2,044.3 6,572
Dalgety UK 320 6,818.6 15,417
Hillsdown Holdings UK 321 6,670.2 44,196
Saint-Louis Group France 332 6,222.4 28,016
Danisco Denmark 378 1,964.7 11,455
Parmalat Italy 382 1,029.0 6,011
Unigate UK 392 2,936.2 25,385
Fromageries Bel France 435 1,156.9 6,352
Bongrain France 479 1,712.5 8,217
Table 4: 1994 F T  500 F ood  P rocessing C om panies
2.1.3 Leading Firms
Another perspective on the structure of food processing industries is provided by 
Tables 4, 5, and 6, which describe EC firms in the food processing, brewing, and 
distilling sectors that appear in the 1994 Financial Times ranking (by market 
capitalisation) of the leading 500 European firms.
It is apparent from Table 4 that the European food processing firms fall 
into two distinct groups. Unilever and Nestlé are large, diversified firms that 
supply a wide variety of food products to markets all over Europe and all over 
the world. They are among the largest companies in the world, without regard 
to industrial sector.
They are also substantially larger than other European food processing 




























































































C o m p a n y C o u n try F T  500 
R a n k
T u rn o v e r  
m illion  $
E m p lo y e e s
Grand M etropolitan UK 28 12,069.9 102,405
Guiness UK 29 6,655.0 24,538
Allied-Lyons UK 76 8,032.3 25,810
Bass UK 93 6,569.6 84,095
Heineken Netherlands 143 4,914.6 23,112
W hitbread UK 151 3,579.0 64,665
Scottish & Newcastle UK 191 2,309.9 28,487
Carlsberg Denmark 229 1,652.4 13,777
Greenalis Group UK 433 807.0 8,039
Table 5: 1994 FT 500 Brewing Companies
C o m p a n y C o u n try F T  500 
R a n k
T u rn o v e r  
m illion  $
E m p lo y e e s
LVMH France 51 3,820.8 15,501
Pernod Ricard France 164 2,557.5 9,381
Remy-Cointreau France 470 1,053.5 3,419
Table 6: 1994 FT 500 Distilling Companies
modestly diversified geographically than the two conglomerate giants. Leaving 
aside Unilever and Nestlé, 17 food processing firms appear among the FT 500. 
8 of the 17 are based in the UK, 5 in France, one each in Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands. These are not, at least not yet, European firms; 
they are national firms that operate in Europe.
The same can be said of the largest European brewing firms, which are 
almost all based in the UK, and the largest distilleries, which are all French. 
Firm operations in EC food processing industries have not yet made the food 
sector a single market; it remains a set of related, but independent, national 
markets.
For comparison purposes, Table 7 gives corresponding information for food 
sector firms from among the 1994 Financial Times ranking of the 100 largest 
US firms. It cannot be said that the largest US firms are consistently larger, in 

































































































Coca-cola 5 13,073.8 31,000
Pepsico 14 21,970.0 371,000
Anheuser-Busch Cos 67 11,393.7 44,871
Sara Lee Corp 69 14,580.0 138,000
Kellogg Co. 70 6,190.6 16,551
Campbell Soup Co. 85 6,263.2 43,256
General Mills Inc 86 7,777.8 121,290
Heinz (H. J.) Co 91 7,103.4 37,700
Table 7: 1994 FT Top 100 US Food Sector Firms
2.2 Specific cases
By way of example, I discuss here two specific industries that are characteristic 
o f some of the general difficulties that foodstuff industries present from the point 
of view of the completion of the single market.
2.2.1 The UK Salt Industry
White salt is a homogeneous commodity, produced by well-known techniques.1 
Two firms of almost equal size (British Industries and Imperial Chemical In­
dustries) have together supplied about 95% of the market. The market is not 
competitive; one firm traditionally acts as a price leader. For a variety of rea­
sons, however, UK producers do not face the prospect of serious rivalry from 
elsewhere in the EC (MMC, p. 44):
There is little international trade in white salt between the Conti­
nent and the United Kingdom. ICI told us that it would not wish to 
engage in ‘head-on’ competition by exporting white salt on a large 
scale to major continental producing countries. Like the United 
Kingdom these countries have excess white salt production capac­
ity. ICI felt that similar considerations would limit the attraction of 
importing white salt into the United Kingdom.




























































































In addition to this lack of rivalry (a tacit agreement not to compete in 
a multimarket oligopoly), technical barriers to entry isolate national markets 
(MMC, p. 44):
Any potential importer would have to set up some form of ware­
housing or bagging plant between the port and customers to meet 
the latters’ requirements on delivery. Relative to United Kingdom 
production such imported salt would incur a double handling cost, 
initially at the ports for loading and unloading and subsequently in 
loading lorries for onward delivery although bagged salt could be 
imported in containers. Handling costs are significant given the low 
bulk value of salt. These costs, in addition to the cost of transporta­
tion, limit the extent to which imported white salt can compete with 
United Kingdom production. A few of the large purchasers of salt 
considered the possibility of importing white salt. In some cases it 
appeared feasible to ship white salt to a United Kingdom port but 
the cost of handling inland distribution proved prohibitive.
At least one of these barriers would not arise for shipment from one conti­
nental EC member state to another, namely, the need to load lorries on arrival 
in the importing market. The cost of transportation, however, will remain a bar­
rier to substantial rivalry across intra-EC borders. The EC white salt market is 
most likely to evolve as a set of regional markets, each supplied by concentrated 
oligopolies2 able to engage in limit pricing up to the level of a relatively slack 
constraint imposed by transportation costs that are high relative to production 
costs.
2.2.2 The German Beer Industry
The German beer industry is unusual in a number of respects. But its evolu­
tion suggests difficulties that are likely to confront the development of a truly 
European market in consumer good industries generally.
The German market is supplied by a large number of small brewers.3
2According to Sutton’s (1991) market share tables, the two largest French firms supply 
about 90% of the market; the largest four German firms about 93%; and the largest four 
Italian firms about 80%.
3See Schwalbach (1985) and Geroski and Schwalbach (1989). Sutton (1991, p. 521) notes 




























































































While seller concentration has increased in recent years, it remains low relative 
to other European markets (Schwalbach, 1985, p. 176):
The four-firm concentration ratio grew from 11.8% in 1958 to 37.8% 
in 1974, but fell thereafter to 34.3% in 1979 and 27.0% in 1982. The 
increase in concentration occurred almost exclusively due to merg­
ers. Insufficient planning o f firm acquisitions and inadequate coordi­
nation between acquired and acquiring firms led to the erosion of the 
market position of those acquiring firms. Instead, internally grow­
ing firms experienced a continuous increase in market share. The 
merger wave of the seventies resulting in a high degree of multi-plant 
operation. Each of the largest three firms operated on average with 
28 plants. Post-merger rationalization led to considerable change 
in the plant structure. The three largest firms together bought 28 
plants, closed 22, built 3, and sold 4 plants during the period 1970- 
1977.
This merger process reinforced the importance of branding and product 
differentiation (Sutton, 1991, p. 524):
Many of the early mergers failed to generate the hoped-for re­
sults. With the wisdom of hindsight, it is possible to identify one 
factor that appears to be of relevance. The key ...merger between 
Dortmunder Union and Schultheiss aimed primarily at cost reduc­
tions achievable through rationalization on the production side. On 
the marketing side, the idea was to build up one brand at the expense 
of the other. As it happened, the combined sales steadily declined 
relative to the sum of the individual market shares of the companies 
acquired. In the case of those [mergers] that have been more success­
ful in their acquisition strategy, the emphasis has been on continuing 
to market and support all brands acquired, while still rationalizing 
through closing down the breweries purchased and shifting produc­
tion to other ...sites.
The experience of the 1970s appears to have convinced most 
German brewers that success in expansion-by-acquisition is most 
easily achieved through a policy of the latter kind. Recent successful 
acquisitions have been based on a strategy of building upon the 
good will associated with the long-standing image of the acquired 




























































































large degree associated with production at a well-known and long- 
established brewery.
In addition to the entry barrier created by product differentiation, long­
term contracts between brewers and restaurants (up to twenty years) and trans­
portation cost are impediments to potential entry.
Sutton (1991) argues theoretically and empirically that endogenous prod­
uct differentiation —  supported among other things by intense advertising —  is 
a formidable barrier to entry that can support a minimum level of seller concen­
tration even in large markets that seem otherwise able to support a competitive 
market structure. The experience of the German beer industry suggests first 
that non-German firms are most likely to be able to enter the German market 
via acquisition o f existing German firms, and second that such entry, if suc­
cessful, will generate relatively little in the way of consolidation of the number 
of brands. Brand proliferation, with the implied adverse impact on market 
performance, is if anything a more likely result.
3 Food Industries in the Single Market
3.1 Barriers at the borders
The case law of the European Community is replete with examples of national 
laws that have the effect of interfering with the free flow of goods across internal 
borders, even though they are not directly concerned with trade policy. Such 
decisions are fundamental to the formation of the Single Market. Some, how­
ever, confirm that national authorities can sometimes erect barriers to intra-EC 
trade, within the framework of Community law.
3.1.1 Cassis de Dijon and the Principle of Mutual Recognition
The Cassis de Dijon decision4 is a preliminary ruling of the European Court of 
Justice in response to a request from a German court for guidance on interpre­
tation of the Treaty of Rome, in particular Article 30, which regulates Member
4Rewe~Zentral AG  v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein [1979] ECR 649; [1979] 
3 CMLR 494. See also Re the importation of pasteurised milk and cream: E.C. Commission 
v. United Kingdom [1988] 2 CMLR 11; Re German sausages: E.C. Commission v. Germany 
[1989] 2 CMLR 733; Re milk substitutes: E.C. Commission v. Germany [1991] 1 CMLR 741; 




























































































State quantitative restrictions on trade flows and measures that have an effect 
equivalent to such restrictions.
The origin of the ruling lay in an attempt by a German firm to import 
a French liqueur, Cassis de Dijon, into Germany. The liqueur had an alcohol 
content ranging from 15 to 20 per cent, which brought it into conflict with 
a German law requiring a minimum alcohol content of 32 per cent for such 
beverages. The Court used the ruling to circumscribe the considerations under 
which national authorities could restrict trade flows:5
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from dis­
parities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the 
products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions 
may be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy manda­
tory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of the public health, the fairness of com­
mercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.
German authorities put forward a number of considerations of this type, 
seeking to defend the challenged restriction, but without success (emphasis 
added)6
...the requirements relating to the minimum alcohol content of al­
coholic beverages do not serve a purpose which is in the general 
interest and as such to take precedence over the requirements of the 
free movement of goods, which constitutes one of the fundamental 
rules of the Community. In practice, the principle effect of require­
ments of this nature is to promote alcoholic beverages having a high 
content by excluding from the national market products of other 
member-States which do not answer that description. It therefore 
appears that the unilateral requirement imposed by the rules of a 
member-State of a minimum alcohol content for the purposes of the 
sale of alcoholic beverages constitutes an obstacle to trade which is 
incompatible with the provisions of Article 30 of the Treaty. There 
is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been law­
fully produced and marketed in one o f the member-States, alcoholic 
beverages should not be introduced into any other member-State; the
5 [1979] 3 CMLR 494 at 508-9. 




























































































sale of such products may not be subject to a legal prohibition on 
the marketing of beverages with an alcohol content lower than the 
limit set by the national views.
The italicized phrase is the principle of mutual recognition, which provides that 
products legally produced and marketed in one member State may legally be 
marketed in other member States (subject to the kinds of public welfare con­
siderations previously indicated).
3.1.2 German champagne bottles and the Principle of Proportion­
ality
This decision7 concerns a German law that limited the use of champagne-type 
bottles to sparkling wines and specified types of wine not made from grapes. 
An attempt to import into Germany a French product, traditionally marketed 
in such bottles, prompted action by the EC Commission to have the Court of 
Justice declare the restriction in violation of Treaty provisions. Even though 
the limitation in question applied equally to foreign and domestic products, the 
Court found that it impeded intra-EEC trade:
Producers in the exporting member-State who wished to market 
pétillant de raisin in the Federal Republic o f Germany would in fact 
be obliged to bottle that product for the specific market in bottles 
different from those which they use in the country of origin as well 
as on the market of other member-States. It would thus be more 
difficult or costly for them to market pétillant de raisin in the Federal 
Republic.
The implied cost differential created for non-German suppliers was sufficient 
to support the finding that the regulation in question was inconsistent with 
Community trade law.
German authorities also argued that the law served to protect consumers, 
by preventing confusion as to the type o f product being purchased. Here the 
Court invoked the principle of proportionality, noting that existing labelling 
requirements, which included a statement of both the nature and the alcoholic 
content of the product, were sufficient to accomplish the same purpose without 
restricting trade.






























































































Another example is provided by a decision involving a German beer purity 
law.8 The effect of the law in question was that beverages commonly marketed 
as ‘beer’ throughout the European Community could not be so marketed in 
Germany, because they did not meet certain ingredients restrictions. German 
authorities defended the restriction on the ground that it was necessary to 
protect the public health; the Court found this to be excessive9
...in so far as the German rules on additives in beer entail a gen­
eral ban on additives, their application to beers imported from other 
member States is contrary to the requirements of Community law..., 
since that prohibition is contrary to the principle of proportionality
...by prohibiting the marketing of beers lawfully manufactured 
and marketed in another member-State if they do not comply with 
sections 9 and 10 of the Biersteuergesetz, the Federal Republic of 
Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 30 of the 
EEC Treaty.
3.1.4 Disposable beer cans and protection of the environment
The background to this decision is an extended skirmish between national au­
thorities and the EC Commission (CEC, 1988, pp. 420-421):
In 1977, the Danish government enacted decree 136, which banned 
the imports of soft drinks in non-refillable containers. Three years 
later, the European Commission ruled against decree 136— reasoning 
that it violated article 30 of the Treaty of Rome— and the Danish 
government promptly replaced it with decree 397, which banned 
the sale of soft drinks and beer in non-refillable bottles, imported 
or domestic. While on the surface it would appear that this does
8 Re purity requirements for beer: E.C. Commission v. Germany [1988] 1 CMLR 780; 
see also Re purity requirements for beer: E.C. Commission v. Greece [1988] 1 CMLR 813; 
Ministere Public v. Gerard Deserbais [1989] 1 CMLR 516; and The State (Italy) v. Enzo 
Nespoli and Giuseppe Crippa, Re low-fat cheese: E.C. Commission v. Italy [1992] 2 CMLR 
1.




























































































not discriminate against importers, the transportation costs of two- 
way bottles makes them impractical over about 200 km—a distance 
easily surpassed when exporting to Denmark. ...
In 1982 the European Commission opened a new case against 
decree 397, but before it could be referred to the European Court, 
the Danish government introduced decree 95, which modified decree 
397 by permitting the sale of non refillable containers, but only in 
limited volumes and only if a return and mandatory deposit system 
on non-refillables was introduced. Decree 95 went into effect in April 
1985. This last substitution of one decree for another has succeeded 
in keeping the case out of court at least [until January 1988].
Arguments that led to a Court of Justice decision were in fact held in 
September 1988.10 The result was a partial success for Danish authorities11
The protection o f the environment has already been considered 
by the Court...as ‘one of the essential objectives of the Community’ 
which may. as such, justify certain restrictions on the principle of 
free movement of goods. Furthermore this assessment is confirmed 
by the Single European Act.
...it must be concluded that protection of the environment is a 
mandatory requirement which may limit the application of Article 
30 of the Treaty.
The Court of Justice held that a requirement to set up a deposit-and- 
return system was an essential part of a system to bring about the use of reusable 
containers, and as such did not conflict with the principle of proportionality. 
It found, however, that the requirement to use only bottles approved by the 
National Agency for the Protection of the Environment was excessive:12
...the system at present in force in Denmark enables the Danish 
authorities to refuse approval to a foreign producer even if he is 
prepared to ensure that returned containers are used again.
In such a situation a foreign producer who nevertheless wishes 
to sell in Denmark would be compelled to manufacture or purchase
10Re disposable beer cans: E.C. Commission v. Denmark [1989] 1 CMLR 619.
11 [1989] 1 CMLR 619 at 630-31.




























































































Product Sector Share Example of barrier
Biscuits and cake 3.87 Carotine restriction for biscuits and cake (UK)
Chocolate & 
confectionary
3.92 Vegetable fat restriction for chocolate (France)
Ice cream 1.13 Vegetable fat restriction for ice cream (Germany)
Beer 3.01 Recycling law for beverages (Denmark)
Mineral water 0.63 “German water bottles” requirement (Germany)
Soft drinks 1.83 Aspartame restriction in soft drink industry (Prance)
Spirits 0.69 Double inspection for spirit im ports (Spain)
Pasta 1.16 Pasta purity law (Italy)
Soup & baby food 1.34 Label detail for soup (Spain)
Total 16.6
Table 8: Foodstuffs product sectors, “Cost of non—Europe” study
“Share” indicates percentage share of 1985 EEC household food expenditures. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1988, pp. 414-415.
containers of a type already approved, which would entail consider­
able extra cost for him and would therefore make it very difficult to 
import his products into the country.
Community law does not seek equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
producers, where the result is differentially higher costs for a foreign producer 
to serve a particular market. The principle of reciprocity requires that a product 
able to be sold in one Member State is also able to be sold in other Member 
States.
Nonetheless, this episode demonstrates that national authorities are often 
motivated to pursue measures that have the effect of erecting barriers to intra- 
EEC trade around their home markets. Provided such measures can be tied to 
some non-commercial goal of the Community, they may survive.
3.2 Gains from Completion of the Single Market?
The Single European Act was adopted to eliminate the subtle barriers to trade 
within the Community, of the kind involved in the Court o f Justice decisions 
treated above, that persisted after conventional barriers— quotas and tariffs— 
had been eliminated. In its study on potential gains from completion of the 
Internal Market, the Commission identified the following types of barriers to 




























































































• specific ingredients restrictions: prohibition of the sales o f products con­
taining particular additives; for example, prohibition of the sale o f bever­
ages containing certain artificial sweeteners in Prance;
• content/denomination regulations: prohibition of the use o f a generic 
name unless specific content requirements are met, i.e., the German beer 
purity law;
• packaging/labeling laws, which raise the cost of marketing by requiring 
different packages or labels in different Member States;
• fiscal measures that effectively discriminate against importers;
• specific importing restrictions: import licenses, health registration re­
quirements, border inspections, product testing, and the like.
Examples of such barriers are shown in Table 8; as the continuing stream of cases 
before the European Court of Justice shows, there is no immediate prospect that 
such barriers are in danger o f extinction.
The EC Commission’s Cost o f non-Europe study identified both direct 
and indirect benefits from completion of the internal market in foodstuffs. Di­
rect benefits were expected to flow from the elimination of the main barriers 
identified above (CEC, 1988, pp. 423-424):
• use of less expensive ingredients;
• reduction in labeling and packaging costs; and
• elimination o f “red tape” surrounding the importing process.
Table 9 summarizes the quantitative assessment of direct benefits, held to 
be between 500 and 1,000 million Ecu per year. This is between 2 and 3 per 
cent of foodstuff industry value added. Table 10 identifies sectors thought most 
likely to be affected by completion of the internal market.
The single most important source of direct savings is a predicted shift 
to less expensive ingredients as barriers to intra-EEC trade fall. That such 




























































































Barrier category Share (%) Amount) 
(million Ecu)
Vegetable fat restriction in chocolate 30 150 300
Beer purity laws 23 115-230
Vegetable fat restriction in ice cream 12 60-120
Pasta purity laws 9 45-90
Saccharimetric content in beer 5 25-50
Plastic containers in Italy 5 25-50
Other 17 85-170
Total 100 500-1000
Table 9: Sources of estimated direct benefits from removal of barriers 
to internal trade, foodstuffs product sectors, “Cost of non—Europe” 
study
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1988, p. 425.
NACE
code













425 Wine & wine-based products 0.34 0.16 N/A
427 Brewing and malting 1.21 0.72 3.27
428 Soft drinks & spa waters 0.53 0.35 4.56




Table 10: Foodstuff sectors most affected by the Internal Market




























































































...it is estimated in the Cecchini Report that major economic ben­
efits will accrue to the food chain. There remains a debate over 
the extent of the potential benefits with many viewing Cecchini’s 
estimate of (500-1000m ECU) as over optimistic. There appears to 
be a view in the Cecchini estimates ...that every manufacturer will 
shift to cheaper ingredients if this is permitted through changes to 
compositional requirements. This is contrary to present views on 
the food sector generally where it is recognised that consumers are 
increasingly seeking out quality products rather than the cheaper 
generic items.
Without venturing to make quantitative estimates, the Commission sug­
gests that indirect benefits from completion of the internal market will exceed 
the direct effects. Sources of such indirect benefits are (CEC, 1988, pp. 427-429)
• the broadening of consumer choice;
• increases in trade (particularly for the German beer industry and the 
Italian pasta industry);
• increases in efficiency, possibly following accentuated industry restructur­
ing and consolidation.
It is specifically suggested that cost savings from the realization of greater 
economies of scale are possible in the German beer industry (CEC, 1988, p. 431). 
There is also an analogy with trends among U.S. food product firms to suggest 
a possible line of development for the EC (CEC, 1988, pp. 434-5):
...US food companies have been pursuing a two-fold strategy in 
their domestic market: become the dominant brand in a product 
sector, and achieve nationwide coverage. The logic underlying this 
strategy is straightforward. Within a product sector, profitability 
of brand leaders is greater than that of “second-tier” brands..., and 
nationwide coverage maximizes volume over which fixed costs....can 
be amortized...
In recent years, US food groups have been reevaluating their 
product portfolios. Rather than dominating a region with a diverse 
range of unrelated products, they are now focusing on achieving 




























































































result, US companies have been acquiring new companies and, more 
importantly, “swapping” business units with each other to realize 
their dual objectives.
It is a standard result of economic models of market structure that in the 
presence of fixed costs, increases in market size— of the kind that would come 
with the completion of the internal market— allow firms to spread fixed costs 
over a greater output, resulting in exactly the kind of cost saving highlighted 
above. To the extent that such cost savings depend on transnational consoli­
dation and restructuring, with a reduction in the number of firms,13 then they 
will be realized only if national authorities go along with such mergers and re­
structurings. As will be seen presently, there is reason to doubt that this is the 
case.
There is, it should be noted, a certain inconsistency between the first and 
third sources of indirect benefits cited above. There are, no doubt, efficiency 
gains to be had by a restructuring that consolidates production of a range of 
competing varieties under the authority of a single firm. But realizing such 
economies will require a reduction in the number of competing brands, as firms 
act to limit unprofitably close competition among its own varieties. Such a 
reorganization of product lines will tend to narrow the range of consumer choice, 
not broaden it.
3.3 National Chauvinism?
3.3.1 Merger patterns in EC foodstuffs
As shown in Table 11, the intertemporal pattern of EC food sector mergers has 
tended to follow that of EC mergers overall. The food sector is typically the 
second most active field for EC mergers, behind the chemical sector; in 1991/92, 
more mergers occurred in the food and drink sector than in any other. But as 
Table 11 makes clear, and as the Commission has noted, most such mergers are 
national (CEC, 1991a, p. 227)
13Theoretical results are sensitive to details of specification. In model of Cournot oligopoly 
in a market with constant price elasticity of demand, a doubling of market size implies that 
the equilibrium number of firms rises by the square root of two (Sutton, 1991, p. 31). With 
linear demand, on the other hand, the equilibrium number of firms is roughly proportional 




























































































Y ea r N a tio n a l C o m m u n ity In tern a tion a l T o ta l
F o o d
S e cto r
T o ta l
A ll  S e c to rs
83/84 7 2 2 11 155
84/85 20 1 1 22 208
85/86 25 7 2 34 227
86/87 39 11 2 52 303
87/88 25 18 8 51 383
88/89 35 27 14 76 492
89/90 41 44 17 102 622
90/91 29 26 16 71 455
91/92 32 23 6 61 383
Table 11: Acquisitions of majority holdings (including mergers), Eu­
ropean Community Food and Drink sector
Source: EC Commission, Annual Report on Competition Policy, various issues.
The number of mergers in [the food and drink] sector increased 
considerably in 1989/90. During this period there were 102 such 
operations (+34%), or one-sixth of all operations in industry. Com­
pared with chemicals, national operations have a greater weight, 
but an intensification of Community operations is undeniably tak­
ing place.
The degree of concentration is much lower than in the chemical 
industry, but it is generally higher nationally than at Community 
level because of the barriers to trade which continue to exist. Owing 
to the still highly compartmentalized nature of the Community mar­
ket, firms with a comparatively small turnover are able to occupy a 
leading position in their home market.
The national character of food industry mergers continues (CEC, 1993, 
p. 501):
In Germany, most of the takeover activity that took place in the 
food and drink sector during the last year was related with the for­
mer GDR. Eight out of the 13 cases registered in Germany during 
that period had as their target a company located in the five new 
Lander. ...the purchasing company was often a German subsidiary 
of another company of non-German origin. Nestlé and Unilever are 




























































































domestic operations. The domestic character of the transactions in 
this sector was even more clear in the case of the United Kingdom. 
Only one of the 12 mergers and takeovers which targeted UK-based 
companies had an international dimension. It is also worthwhile to 
mention here the great activity deployed by British holding compa­
nies in the food and drink sector. Three British companies, Grand 
Metropolitan, Hillsdown Holdings and Northern Foods, accounted 
for 14 of the 52 takeovers and mergers registered in the Community 
in 1991/92. Grand Metropolitan by itself was the acquiring com­
pany in 7 out of 19 takeovers and mergers of Community dimension 
which took place [in 1991/92], Hillsdown Holdings and Northern 
Foods accounted for almost two thirds of the domestic operations 
registered in the United Kingdom.
3.3.2 Perrier
The 1992 Perrier episode, an unsuccessful attempt by Fiat interests to diversify 
into France, illustrates the kinds of barriers facing business interests that seek 
to operate at the Community level. This is a fascinating case in which a large, 
diversified Community industrial group failed to take over a French firm, despite 
careful preparation and despite apparently reaching a 49% ownership share of 
the target firm.
Over a period of five years, Fiat cultivated links with a major French 
investment bank, Lézard Frères, and with the largest French food processing 
firm, BSN (see Table 4). Fiat interests and BSN exchanged minor shareholdings, 
and representatives of each group sat on various boards of directors of the other. 
BSN, initially a Fiat ally in its efforts to acquire control of Perrier, apparently 
became anxious about the prospect of entry by an important conglomerate into 
its own home markets. Rightly or wrongly, the takeover attempt was portrayed 
as damaging to interests of minority shareholders. At a certain point, Fiat’s 
entitlement to 13.8% out of its 48.8% share o f Perrier was nullified on the ground 
that it followed earlier transactions that violated French financial regulations.
Nationalist sentiments were an important factor in the outcome (de Jon- 
quières, 1992, p. 14):
...the high-powered public relations campaign...effectively branded 
the Agnellis as menacing interlopers and Nestlé as the acceptable 




























































































Just as remarkably, the campaign succeeded in portraying Nestlé, 
a company from a non-EC country not renowned for respecting 
minority investors, as a shining champion of disenfranchised French 
shareholders.
In its discussion of the compatibility of the eventual takeover of Perrier by 
Nestlé, the Commission noted among other things that (CEC, 1993, p. 148)1/1
Nestlé and BSN had engaged in clear joint deterrent action vis-à-vis 
newcomers by jointly opposing the public bid of the Agnelli group 
and by sharing Perrier between themselves.
In attempts to extend operations through the Community, European firms 
will face not only administrative barriers erected by Member State governments, 
but also the lively possibility of strategic reaction by firms based in the target 
markets. As our review of European Court of Justice decisions indicates, the 
former type of impediment can be controlled by the European Commission. 
The latter, which is inherent in oligopolistic markets, is much more difficult to 
prevent.
4 Conclusion
The EC Commission has been vigilant in attacking non-tariff and quota bar­
riers to trade flows between Member States. The history of the EC foodstuffs 
industries suggests that this is a necessary but not sufficient strategy for the 
development o f truly single foodstuffs markets in the Community.
The first obstacle is nationalist attitudes of Member State governments. 
The realization of efficiency gains from the formation of the Single Market will
14The aftermath is not without interest from the point of view of the development of the 
Commission’s approach to merger control (CEC, 1993, p. 149):
In order to avoid a prohibition decision, Nestlé entered into a commitment vis- 
à-vis the Commission by which it undertook to divest a number of sources and 
brands, the total of which will amount to 3 000 million litres of water capacity.
This capacity represents approximately 20% of the total capacity previously 
held by Nestlé, Perrier and BSN. The divestiture must be made to a strong 
purchaser to be approved by the Commission and create a viable competitor 




























































































require consolidation. That will often require a reduction in the number of firms 
in the Community, and a reorganization of production in more efficient units. 
If nationalist authorities act to minimize the mergers and concentrations that 
are the primary vehicle for such reorganizations, efficiency gains will be long in 
coming.
The second obstacle to market integration is the nationalist attitudes of 
the suppliers of what have been oligopolistic national markets. When firms in 
each Member State make investment decisions based on commercial opportuni­
ties in all Member States, there will be a Single Market. So long as firms seek 
primarily to become the leading firm in their home Member State, forbearing 
opportunities to compete vigorously in other markets for fear o f inviting re­
sponses that will interfere with their own quiet life, the Community will be a 
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